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Non-technical summary
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the oldest specialised agency within the
United Nations framework. Although the tasks of the organisation have undergone several
changes over time, its main instrument has always been the setting of international labour
standards. The most important of these are conventions, which can be ratified by member
states and thus become legally binding on them, and recommendations, which often contain
more detailed provisions but do not create legal obligations.
Up to the summer of 1999, a total of 182 conventions and 190 recommendations have been
adopted. In 6,604 cases, member states have ratified a convention. This paper is an attempt to
provide more detailed statistical information. It focuses on three important stages in decision-
making: the adoption of standards, the ratification of ILO conventions and the use of the
ILO's supervision procedures.
Labour standards are adopted by the International Labour Conference, a tripartite body which
comprises government delegates as well as delegates representing employers and workers.
Although formally, the decision rule is two-thirds qualified majority voting, many decisions
are actually made by near-consensus. However, there is a sizeable opposition against the
adoption of standards in the case of working conditions. Most of the votes against or
abstentions come from the group of employer delegates. Within the Conference committees
where the legal details are negotiated, majority voting can be quite frequent, with a weak and
partially interrupted trend towards more consensus-based decisions over time.
The decision to ratify ILO conventions is made by the member states. Ratification numbers
thus provide an, admittedly rough, measure of the acceptance of ILO conventions. This paper
contains, for the first time in the literature, estimates of the probability of ratification a given
number of years after the adoption. For instance, after 25 years the probability of having
ratified a convention is about 25 per cent. Huge differences can be observed, however, across
groups of states, such as industrialised and developing countries, and over convention
subjects. It is also noteworthy that the process of ratification extends over a long period of
time. It is not infrequent that states ratify conventions which have been adopted decades ago.
Among international organisations, the ILO has a unique supervisory system. Countries are
obliged to report, in regular intervals, on the application of the conventions they have ratified.
At the ILO, a committee of independent experts evaluates these reports. If a country does not
fulfil its obligations, the committee may issue an observation. Our statistical exploration
shows that in most cases observations are made repeatedly, reflecting the long-term nature of
the supervision task. Again, there is a clear difference in the number of observations received
between industrialised and developing countries as well as across convention subjects.
These results do not rest on any specific economic or political theory of international
organisations. Instead, they aim at establishing a few stylised facts upon which subsequent
theoretical research may build.
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Abstract:
The subject of this paper is decision-making on the adoption, ratification and implementation
of conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)- The
first part of the paper providesa brief introduction to the ILO as an international organisation,
its treaty base and its most important bodies. In the second part of the paper, we focus on in-
ternational labour standards. We first explain the decision-making procedure within the ILO
which leads to the adoption of conventions and recommendations. We then deal with the rati-
fication of conventions at the national stage and discuss the compliance with the obligations
arising from ratification. The focus of the paper is not so much on the formal rules and proce-
dures but on the question of how the rules are applied. Descriptive statistics give evidence on
the degree of consensus at the decision-making stage, the voting behaviour of the delegates to
the International Labour Conference, the ratification behaviour of member countries, and
problems of implementation.
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1 Introduction
Since the foundation of the International Labour Organization in 1919, 182 conventions and
190 recommendations in many different fields of labour and social legislation have been
adopted. With an average rate of two or three conventions and a similar number of recom-
mendations per year, the ILO has been producing a fairly regular output. Up to July 1999, ILO
conventions have received a total of 6604 ratifications which means that each of the ILO's
174 member states has ratified, on average, 38 conventions.
The apparent stability of the ILO's output during varied historical circumstances corresponds
to the fact that its formal decision rules and procedures have changed very little over time. But
before any conclusions as to the working of the ILO as an international negotiation system
can be drawn, one should take a closer look at the actual application of the procedures. Some
of the questions that arise in this context are: Have the subjects dealt with by ILO standards
changed over time? Have there been changes in the application of the majority requirements?
Have there been any changes in the propensity to ratify conventions? What does the geo-
graphic pattern of ratification look like? And finally, what can be said about implementation
behaviour?
What is attempted in this paper is not a full description of the ILO's formal decision proce-
dures. There is no scarcity of works, often written by ILO lawyers themselves, which discuss
the legal details in much greater depth than is possible here. Nor do we try to explain how
delegates vote or why certain countries ratify certain conventions while others do not - these
are questions that must be tackled in further research. In this paper, we use statistical methods
to describe the practice of decision-making within the formal rules given by the ILO's Con-
stitution and its various legal subtexts. This seems particularly important because hardly any
statistical analyses have been published since the extensive studies by Haas (1962) and Lan-
delius (1965). As the earlier decades are already covered by these studies and the amount of
data processed must be kept manageable, we concentrate on the period after 1960.
Historically, the main instrument of the ILO have always been international labour standards.
Other functions of the ILO, such as providing technical assistance or collecting internationally
comparable information on labour issues, will be discussed only briefly in this paper. The first
part provides a short introduction to the ILO as an international organisation, its treaty base
and its most important bodies. In the remainder of the paper, the decision-making procedure
that leads to conventions or recommendations will be discussed in detail. We will follow this
process roughly in chronological order. First, we deal with the adoption of conventions and
recommendations at the International Labour Conference. Next, we gather evidence about the
ratification of conventions at the national stage. Thirdly, the implementation of conventions is
considered. A final section summarises the main findings.
All the statistical information presented in this paper is taken from official ILO sources. In-
formation on voting behaviour was collected from the printed Records of Proceedings of the
International Labour Conference. The data on the ratification and denunciation of conventions
presented in sections 4 and 5 was obtained from the ILOLEX database, available both on CD-
ROM and over the internet.
2 An overview of the ILO
2.1 History and task
The original reason why the ILO was set up was the concern of trade unionists, governments
and philantropic employers that working conditions could not be improved in one country if
this led, through a subsequent rise in the costs of production, to a loss of market share for do-
mestic producers. To block this mechanism, some degree of international coordination
seemed to be required. Among governments, the Swiss in particular promoted the establish-
ment of an international organisation. As a result, the first international conference on worker
protection took place in Berlin in 1889. In 1900, the International Association for Labour
Legislation was set up in Basle, with its secretariat already called the International Labour
Office. The first proposals for international conventions originated inside the Association, and
in 1905, a diplomatic conference was held to this purpose in Berne. In the following year, two
conventions were adopted by a technical (i.e., non-diplomatic) conference. The first of these
concerned night work of women, the second banned the use of white phosphorus in the pro-
duction of matches. Up to the start of the first world war, a number of bilateral treaties on la-
bour market conditions had also been signed by industrialised countries.
The ILO was founded in 1919, throughout the western world a significant year for labour and
social legislation. Its constitution, drafted by a committee set up by the Peace Conference,
became Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. It has been, in principle, the legal basis of the
ILO until today.
According to the preamble of the Constitution, the first aim of the ILO is to further "universal
and lasting peace", which could be established "only if it is based upon social justice". This
objective was most topical in the wake of the Bolshevist revolution in Russia (Kruglak 1989:
180). To realise the aim of social justice, the regulation of labour markets seemed to be neces-
sary. But this regulation would have to be international, since "the failure of any nation to
adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to
improve the conditions in their own countries" (ILO Constitution, Preamble). This economic
argument is rarely found in later texts such as the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, but it
reappeared in the 1970s with the spread of multinational companies and the extension of in-
ternational trade (Ghebali 1989: 6Iff).
The first International Labour Conference saw the adoption of six conventions, dealing with
working time, night work of women and children, unemployment, minimum age and mater-
nity protection. In 1939, the number of conventions adopted stood at 67, and the number of
members had increased from 46 in 1919 to 68.
In 1944, the Declaration of Philadelphia was annexed to the Constitution, describing the fun-
damental aims and principles of the organisation. There was some change in emphasis:
whereas the Preamble of the ILO Constitution had focused exclusively on labour policies such
as limits to working time, social insurance, the right to organise or the provision of training,
the Declaration referred to a much broader set of issues, including stabilisation policy and
development aid.'
With de-colonialisation and the subsequent accession to ILO membership of many African
and Asian states, assistance in the development of labour law and social security has also be-
come an important concern of the ILO. International labour standards serve as model legisla-
tion or a benchmark to which existing national legislation can be compared (Bartolomei de la
Cruz et al. 1996: 25f.). Perhaps even more important for the relation between the ILO and the
developing countries (and in the post-communist era, also the East European nations) was the
expansion of technical assistance programmes supervised by the ILO. Administering technical
assistance was never mentioned in the ILO Constitution as one of the organisation's tasks.
However, this activity contributed much to the post-war growth of the International Labour
Office, the ILO's bureaucracy.
2.2 Membership
With 174 countries (in 1999), membership of the ILO is almost universal. Only a small num-
ber of countries, such as Bhutan, Greenland, North Korea and Sikkim, are missing from the
membership list, together with small islands (like Nauru, Samoa or Tonga) or territories (such
as Andorra and Liechtenstein). Formally, the admission to membership requires either mem-
bership of the United Nations or admission by two-thirds of the delegates of the International
Labour Conference (Constitution, Article 1,3-4).
Initially, the ILO had only members from industrialised countries. The end of the colonial rule
changed the composition of membership dramatically, with the industrialised countries being
in a minority position from the early 1970s onwards. Cleavages among the ILO members,
however, arose not only along different degrees of economic development, but also as a con-
sequence of the east-west confrontation during the cold war. The Soviet Union, which had
ceased its membership in 1940, re-entered the ILO in 1954; and all the other countries in the
Eastern bloc (except for Romania, which left the ILO in 1942 and re-entered in 1956) were
continually ILO members. "Inasmuch as the Soviet union remained very passive toward the
ILO until 1954 and the influx of small, impoverished newly formed nations did not gain mo-
mentum until 1956, perhaps the mid-fifties is a more important demarcation than the Second
World War" (Landelius 1965: 20).
Member states may withdraw from the ILO. A number of countries, most of them governed
by right-wing authoritarian regimes, did so in the 1930s. More recently, South Africa left the
ILO in 1966 (re-entered 1994), and the United States withdrew temporarily from 1977 to
1980. A withdrawal, however, takes effect only after two years. Moreover, the country re-
mains subject to the obligations which follow from the ratification of convention. This means
that the supervision of the application of these conventions also remains in force, except for
those conventions which the former member has explicitly denounced.
For an explanation of the growth of competences sought by the ILO and the change in its official goals,
see Dufty (1972).
2.3 Organisation
The principal bodies of the ILO are the International Labour Conference, the Governing
Body, and the International Labour Office (ILO Constitution, Article 2).
2.3.1 The International Labour Conference
2.3.1.1 Tasks of the Conference
The International Labour Conference is the supreme organ of the ILO. It convenes once a
year, in recent history always in June.2 It is ultimately responsible for the adoption, by quali-
fied majority voting, of labour standards. The Conference is also responsible for the supervi-
sion of the application of ratified conventions. The Conference adopts the programme and
budget of the ILO as proposed by the Governing Body. It decides over amendments to the
ILO Constitution. Finally, it elects, every three years, the Governing Body (see below).
A separate Conference has been established for the maritime sector. The Maritime Conference
also adopts conventions and recommendations but meets less frequently. There have also been
Regional Conferences but these have never been allowed to adopt their own standards, for
fear that this might dilute the power of the ILO's labour standards (Bartolomei de la Cruz et
al. 1996: 27; Valticos and von Potobsky 1995: 55.). For budgetary reasons, the Regional Con-
ferences have recently been scaled down in importance and are now called "Meetings" instead
of "Conferences".3
2.3.1.2 Composition
The composition of the Conference follows, according to Article 3,1 of the Constitution, the
principle of tripartism. Each member state sends two government delegates as well as one
employer delegate and one worker delegate to the conference. All delegates have the right to
vote individually (Constitution, Article 4,1). Worker and employer delegates are appointed by
the governments, but the agreement of the most representative industrial organisations is re-
quired (Bartolomei de la Cruz et al., 1996: 1 If.). If the worker or the employer delegate of a
member country is absent from the Conference, the other may still participate but has no right
to vote. Delegates are accompanied by technical advisors who represent them in committees;
their number is limited to two for each item on the Conference agenda.
Government, employer and worker delegates form their respective groups, which have the
task of nominating the Vice Presidents of the Conference as well as the members of the vari-
ous Conference committees. Group meetings also serve to coordinate the voting behaviour
inside each group. The degree to which such a coordination has taken place in the past has
differed;4 Haas (1962) and Landelius (1965) devoted much attention to this question. In their
2 During the Second World War, no meetings were held.
3 The specific rules of these meetings were adopted by the Governing Body in November 1997.
4 For instance, Haas (1962: 341) reports that, while the union and employer groups have tried to find
common positions in substantive matters, the government group functioned only for procedural issues.
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statistical analyses, they find that there was a much higher cohesion in the worker group than
in the other two groups.
Most specific issues, such as the legal texts of international labour standards, are discussed
within Conference committees. According to Article 17,1 of the ILO Constitution, the Con-
ference regulates its own procedure, including the set-up and the composition of committees
for issues on the Conference's agenda. The procedure for the nomination of committee mem-
bers is left to the delegate groups (Article 70 Conference Standing Orders).5 In the Conference
committees, technical experts often act for the Conference delegates because they possess
more detailed knowledge of the issue to be decided.
There are also a number of standing committees, such as the credentials, selection, drafting
and finance committees, the constitutional amendment committee, the Standing Orders com-
mittee, and the committee on freedom of association. Important committees for the supervi-
sion of labour standards are the Conference committee on the application of standards and the
committee of experts on the application of conventions and recommendations (CEACR; see
section 5). The latter is composed of 20 legal experts, appointed by the Governing Body, who
assess member states' actions towards ILO conventions and recommendations.
2.3.1.3 Procedure of the Conference
A typical conference begins with technical or procedural issues. It then hears the reports of the
Governing Body and the Director-General. A large proportion of assembly time is devoted to
statements by delegates to these reports. Discussion in this context is often not related to any
specific labour standard. There are usually hundreds of delegates who give statements, and
there is a time limit for all speeches made by delegates.6
The remaining time is mainly spent discussing and deciding on committee reports. The prin-
cipal decision mechanism at the Conference is majority voting. In plenary meetings, voting is
by simple majority, except for cases where the Constitution explicitly requires other majori-
ties (Constitution, Article 17,2). The most important exception is the final vote on conven-
tions and recommendations, which is done by a two-thirds rule (Article 18,2).7
Within the committees, voting is always by simple majority. In contrast to the plenary ses-
sions, governments, workers and employers have equal voting rights in committees, with the
number of votes weighted such that all three groups are represented with equal strength (Con-
ference Standing Orders, Article 65).
For the Governing Body, Osieke (1984: 406) reports that there has been an increase in efforts to clear
up differences in the government group before plenary sessions.
Only the nomination of government delegates to committees is dealt with in the Conference Standing
Orders (Article 75).
The limit has been recently shortened to five minutes, see Governing Body document GB 274/LILS/2.
The other cases are: admission of new members (ILO Constitution, Article 1); denial of admission to
the Conference (Article 3); a change of the ILO's seat (Article 6); approval of the budget (Article 13);
allowing a member to vote despite arrears in contributions (Article 13); the inclusion of subjects on the
Conference's agenda (Article 16); and changes in the Constitution (Article 36).
Both in plenary sessions as well as in committees, every member may propose motions to
procedure, resolutions or amendments to the texts under discussion.8 If there is more than one
amendment to a text, the order of votes is at the discretion of the President. The amendment
that comes out successfully must be voted individually against the status quo.
Since the statistical analysis of section 3 deals mainly with the outcomes of voting, some ex-
planations as to the voting procedures are required. The most formalised kind of votes are
record votes (or roll-call votes). The defining characteristic of a record vote is that individual
delegates' voting acts are documented; in the case of record votes in plenary session, the indi-
vidual delegate's voting decision can be looked up in the Conference's Record of Proceed-
ings.9 Record votes must be held at the final voting stage of a convention or recommendation,
and in all other cases in which a majority of two-thirds of the votes is required by the Consti-
tution.10 Record votes also take place if requested by more than 90 delegates or by the Chair-
man of a group (Article 19,6 of the Conference Standing Orders), and in cases of doubt as to
the result of a vote by show of hands (Article 19,4). In practice, those record votes which are
not required by the Constitution mostly take place after a vote by show of hands has failed to
produce a quorum. In some cases, delegates may also require a record vote in order to make
public the voting behaviour of others, putting them under pressure if their voting intention is
unpopular in their home countries."
A second method of voting is by show of hands. Here, the ILO documents the number of
votes for and against and the number of declared abstentions, but individual votes are accessi-
ble only during the session at which the vote is taken, and are not published. Both types of
votes are executed by electronic means. Motions to which there is no apparent opposition and
which need not be decided by a record vote are often adopted without any formal vote taking
place at all.
There has also been, since the late 1970s, the possibility of a secret ballot. It was introduced in
order to give union and employer delegates more autonomy in their voting behaviour. Unlike
in a vote by show of hands, delegates cannot be held accountable by their governments in a
ballot vote, a problem which occurred frequently in the case of authoritarian states (Masters
1996: 22). However, a secret ballot is not admissible when the required majority is two-thirds
(Conference Standing Orders, Article 19,5). A secret ballot can be held at the request of at
least 90 delegates whenever a record vote is not required. For the election of the President of
the Conference, a secret ballot is obligatory (Article 19,10).
Motions may be moved any time without prior notice. The text of amendments must be handed in to the
Conference Secretariat before the amendment is moved. In the case of resolutions, the text must be re-
ceived two days before a decision can be taken (Conference Standing Orders, Article 15).
Record votes at the Committee stage are not officially published by the ILO.
An exception occurs when the Conference votes on the inclusion in the agenda of the following of an
item already discussed at the present session. This decision requires a majority of two-thirds, but no re-
cord vote is required.
In practice, the largest number of record votes concern conventions and recommendations. Most of the
others deal with the programme and budget or membership, voting, credentials or selection issues. Con-
stitutional changes, which also require a record vote, have been relatively rare after 1960 compared to
earlier periods (cf. Landelius, 1965: 70ff).
An important issue is the size of the quorum. The ILO Constitution provides that, independ-
ently of the required majority or the voting procedure, voting in plenary session "is void un-
less the total number of votes cast is equal to half the number of the delegates attending the
Conference" (Article 17,3). More precisely, Article 20 of the Standing Orders of the Confer-
ence stipulates that "a vote is not valid if the number of votes castybr and against is less than
half the number of delegates attending the Conference and entitled to vote" (emphasis
added).12 Therefore, delegates who have declared their abstention do not count towards the
quorum.
In order to prevent a convention from being adopted, it may thus be equally effective (or even
more effective) to abstain rather than vote "no". The lack of quorum is not an infrequent vot-
ing result, although this is true more for the Committee stage than for the final record votes.13
The 1986 revisions to the ILO Constitution, which have as yet not come into force,14 changed,
on a proposal by the worker delegates, the quorum rule in such a way that votes recorded as
abstentions will in future count towards the quorum (Kruglak 1989; Maupin 1987). They will
not, however, count towards voting decisions: the number of "yes" votes must still only be
higher than the number of "no" votes, not higher than the sum of votes against plus declared
abstentions. The separation of these two issues might produce odd voting results." In order to
prevent this, a minimum majority will be fixed numerically (Ghebali 1989: 184, 200). The
object of the change was to make "strategic" abstentions more difficult. In future, delegates
wanting to prevent a quorum will have to "vote with their feet", i.e. not participate in voting at
all (Maupin 1987: 487).
2.3.2 The Governing Body
2.3.2.1 Tasks
The most important function of the Governing Body is to set up the Conference agenda. The
Governing Body also establishes the programme and the budget, it elects the Director-
General, and it supervises the work of the International Labour Office. The Governing Body
meets three times a year.
2.3.2.2 Composition
Similar to the Conference, the composition of the Governing Body is tripartite. It consists of
28 government members, 14 employer members and 14 worker members. Ten of the govern-
ment seats are permanently held by states of "chief industrial importance" (including China
12 in committees, the Quorum is two-fifths of the sum of the yes- and no-votes (Conference Standing Or-
ders, Article 65).
13 "Abstentions become a real weapon, more effective than negative votes for blocking a decision consid-
ered politically inexpedient" (Ghebali 1989: 184).
14 Constitutional changes have to be ratified or accepted by two-thirds of the member countries before
they take effect (Constitution, Article 36).
15 For example, a convention could be adopted with one single vote and all the others declaring their ab-
stention.
and India). Representatives of other member countries are elected at the Conference every
three years, taking into account their geographical provenance. According to the constitutional
changes adopted in 1987, the permanent seats will be abolished and the overall number of
seats will double.
Workers' and employers' representatives in the Governing Body are elected in a personal ca-
pacity by their groups from the Conference delegates (Governing Body Standing Orders, Arti-
cle 7, 1-4). The Governing Body is headed by a chairman and two vice-chairmen, one from
each of the three groups.
There are a number of committees to the Governing Body. Some of these are more technical
in nature, dealing with administrative and organisational matters such as the programme, fi-
nancial and administrative committee (PFA) and the committee on technical cooperation
(TC). Others have certain functions in the supervision of existing standards or the revision of
instruments, such as the committee on legal issues and international labour standards (LILS)
or the working party on policy regarding the revision of standards (WP/PRS). A third group of
committees deals with certain issues that have been found to be particularly important, such as
the committee on freedom of association (CFA), the committee on employment and social
policy (ESP), the working party on the social dimensions of the liberalisation of international
trade (WP/SDL) or the subcommittee on multinational enterprises (MNE).
2.3.2.3 Procedure
With the assistance of the Director-General, the Governing Body chairman and vice-chairmen
draw up the agenda of the Governing Body. Decision-making within this body follows an
open rule procedure. Article 15 of the Governing Body Standing Orders stipulates that "any
member of the Governing Body or any substitute or deputy member occupying the seat of a
regular member may move resolutions, amendments or motions". The majority required is, in
most cases, a simple majority, although certain decisions require an extraordinary majority or
unanimity.15 In practice, almost all decisions are made by consensus. In cases of doubt as to
the outcome of a vote, a roll-call vote may be taken.17
2.3.3 The International Labour Office
The International Labour Office is the permanent secretariat of the ILO. In the context of in-
ternational labour standards, its main task is to provide documentation and studies on the is-
sues before the Conference and the Governing Body. It also serves as the secretariat for
meetings. The Office administers the ILO's technical cooperation programme. Furthermore, it
publishes a wide range of statistical documents as well as specialised studies, reports and pe-
riodicals.
When a proposal to place an item on the agenda of the Conference is discussed for the first time by the
Governing Body, a unanimous decision is required for a decision at the same session. Scheduling a sin-
gle discussion instead of the usual double discussion procedure (see below) requires a majority of three
fifths. (Governing Body Standing Orders, Article 10).
Voting behaviour in the Governing Body is not published by the ILO.
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The International Labour Office is headed by the Director-General, who is elected for a five-
year renewable term (since 1999, the Director-General is Juan Somavia from Chile). The Of-
fice employs some 1,900 officials at its Geneva headquarters. It is structured into a large
number of departments. In the context of international labour standards, the most interesting
one is the standards department. There are three subdivisions: NORMES, which is concerned
with international labour standards and human rights, the relations and meetings division, and
the sectoral activities division.
There are, in addition, 40 field offices around the world, and some 600 experts undertake
missions in all regions of the world within the programme of technical cooperation. A number
of institutes or research, teaching and technical cooperation work under the leadership of the
Office, such as the International Training Centre in Turin, Italy and the International Institute
of Labour Studies in Geneva.
2.4 International labour standards
2.4.1 Different types of standards
There are two different legal instruments for international labour standards: conventions and
recommendations. The principle difference between them is that only the former can be rati-
fied by member states and thus become legally binding. While the exact legal nature of the
ILO conventions is disputed among lawyers,18-there is no disagreement that once a convention
is ratified, the ratifying country is under an obligation to ensure the application of the standard
given in the convention. The application of conventions is supervised by the ILO; each coun-
try is under an obligation to provide the required information.
Recommendations were introduced "to meet circumstances where the subject, or aspect of it,
dealt with is not considered suitable or appropriate at that time for a Convention" (ILO Con-
stitution, Article 19,1). They are most frequently used to supplement conventions, either giv-
ing more details on the content of the standard or sometimes setting a higher standard than the
convention. Recommendations are often more "technical" in nature than conventions, and are
adopted in areas where the diversity in national institutions is large.
Apart from conventions and recommendations, the Conference also adopts protocols. Proto-
cols partially revise conventions. They are open to ratification only by states already bound by
the convention.
2.4.2 The contents of ILO standards
Which matters are covered by international labour standards? Table 1 gives summary infor-
mation on all conventions and recommendations adopted by the International Labour Confer-
ence since its beginnings. Conventions and recommendations are grouped according to the
categories of the "classified guide", the official subject classification scheme used by the ILO.
It is contested whether ILO conventions are contracts between states, or whether they are international
laws; see Bartolomei de la Cruz et al., 1996: 21ff., Landelius, 1965: lOff., Morhard, 1988, Valticos and
vonPotobsky, 1995: 50ff.
Table 1: Number of conventions and recommendations by subject category
Subject categories
Basic human rights
Employment
Social policy
Labour administration
Industrial relations
Conditions of work
among these, occupational safety
and health standards
Social security
Employment of women
Employment of children and young
persons
Migrant workers
Indigenous and tribal peoples
Other special categories (seafarers,
older workers, fishermen etc.)
Other subjects
All subjects
Conventions
1919-97
11
9
1
6
1
47
20
21
6
13
5
6
53
2
181
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.25)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.03)
(0.07)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.30)
(0.01)
(1.00)
1960-97
4
5
1
4
1
23
15
5
0
3
2
0
18
1
67
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.02)
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.35)
(0.23)
(0.08)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.27)
(0.02)
(1.00)
Recommendations
1919-97
8
25
1
8
8
57
33
16
4
9
8
4
40
0
188
(0.04)
(0.13)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.31)
(0.18)
(0.09)
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.21)
(0.00)
(1.00)
1960-97
4
8
1
4
5
24
16
5
1
3
1
0
20
0
76
(0.05)
(0.11)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.07)
(0.32)
(0.21)
(0.07)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.26)
(0.00)
(1.00)
Note: Numbers in brackets are percentage shares. These may not sum to 1.00 due to rounding
errors.
It is evident from the table that working conditions form the largest single subject area for
international labour standards; one third of all conventions and recommendations belong to
this group. Other areas where a large number of standards have been adopted are social secu-
rity, employment policy, and the employment of children. Roughly one quarter of all stan-
dards are specific to certain groups of workers. Comparing the subjects of conventions and
recommendations, we find that there are more recommendations than conventions in the area
of employment policies or industrial relations. Industrial relations is an area where institu-
tional arrangements differ widely across countries, hence it is unsurprising that most standards
are recommendations. Employment policies may be seen as the prerogative of the individual
state, hence there may have been resistance against the adoption of more binding international
standards.
A notable change over time is the increase in the proportion of conventions on working con-
ditions during the last 37 years as compared to the whole period of the ILO's existence. This
increase is particularly strong among health and safety regulations. There is also an increase in
the number of standards on labour administration and industrial relations which may reflect
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the need of newly formed states for model legislation. Otherwise, there is no clear pattern of
change over time.
Labour standards can also be categorised according to their importance. A succession of
working parties of the Governing Body have been established to evaluate the usefulness of
conventions and recommendations and make proposals for possible revisions. The first of
these working parties, set up in 1974, proposed three categories for existing standards. About
half of them were classified as topical. A need for revision was seen for 16 conventions and
14 recommendations. A total of 63 conventions and 81 recommendations were considered
outdated (Ghebali, 1989: 214ff). Two further working groups, one active between 1984 and
1987, the other set up in 1994, continued this task.19 In addition, the Governing Body desig-
nated seven conventions in the areas of freedom of association, forced labour, equality and the
abolition of forced labour as "fundamental" conventions. They are complemented by four
"priority conventions" covering labour inspection and employment policy. The importance
given to these conventions is reflected by the stronger reporting requirements in the supervi-
sion procedure (see section 5).
2.4.3 The issue of flexibility
ILO conventions can only be ratified as a whole, and there is normally only one convention
covering a particular subject open to ratification. A situation the ILO has always carefully
tried to avoid is that members states could have a menu of standards of different tightness to
choose from. Hence, they are required to make an all-or-nothing decision when they adjust
their labour legislation to international standards. If, however, there is only one standard for
all countries, it is difficult to account for different levels of productivity as well as differences
in work organisation, industrial relations and government intervention. While the ILO's all-
or-nothing approach may sometimes result in greater changes to national labour legislation
than could be expected otherwise, it is also likely to lead to a smaller number of ratifications.
The ILO has tried to preserve some degree of controlled flexibilitity in its standards (Hand-
book of Procedures, Paragraph 8). For instance, conventions may only formulate certain
goals, with the more technical requirements laid down in recommendations. Some conven-
tions offer alternatives to fulfilling the requirements given in the standard, such that they can
be more easily implemented by member states with differing institutional frameworks. Other
conventions are divided into several parts which can be ratified separately (although this is not
the rule). Furthermore, conventions sometimes grant derogations to particular groups of
countries, professions, etc.
In spite of the measures taken to make the contents of standards more flexible, critique as to
its contents is often heard, in particular from the emerging economies. The complaints are that
the standards take too much account of the conditions in the industrialised world, being too
rigid for developing countries or covering subjects which are irrelevant to them (Bartolomei
de la Cruz et al. 1996: 57, 117). The actual ratification behaviour across different groups of
countries reflects this problem (see section 4). The results of the ILO supervision procedures
I 9 The most recent account is given in Governing Body document GB.276/LILS/WP/PRS/1.
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(see section 5) also indicate higher costs of compliance with ILO conventions for non-
industrialised countries.
2.5 The ILO's technical cooperation programmes
Apart from standard setting, the ILO engages, under the headline of technical cooperation, in
development aid in the area of employment, working conditions, industrial relations and other
labour-related subjects. A more extensive description than can be given here is contained in
ILO (1993) and earlier ILO reports on the same subject.
Technical cooperation started in the early 1950s.20 It is financed to some degree by the ILO's
regular budget. Most resources, however, come from the United Nations Development Pro-
gramm (UNDP) and from multi-bilateral programmes.21 The majority of projects concern vo-
cational training (the single most important area of technical cooperation), the development of
enterprises and cooperatives, child labour and working conditions. During the 1987 to 1991
period, more than half of the ILO's technical assistance was spent on projects in Africa.
The interaction between technical cooperation and standard-setting has been under discussion
for a number of years. A report to the Governing Body issued in 199222 proposed to
strengthen this link. According to this report, technical cooperation should mainly assist
member states in applying the standards they have ratified, which implicitly means that only
those countries can profit from technical cooperation which have ratified the conventions
adopted in the particular field. To what extent these principles have subsequently been
adopted seems to be, however, an open question. Employers have stressed the independent
function of technical cooperation which should be maintained in areas where no specific in-
ternational labour standards have been adopted, such as employment creation and productivity
improvement (BDA, 1995: 160).
2.6 Conclusion
The ILO is the oldest specialised agency of the United Nations System and one of its largest.
It had, in 1998-9, a biennial budget of US $ 481 million, about 26 per cent smaller than the
Budget of the FAO and about 43 per cent smaller than the WHO budget. As with many inter-
national organisations, there has recently been much pressure to reduce the costs of the ILO
operation, in particular from the United States. Traditionally, standard setting has been the
core activity of the ILO. During the last fifty years, development aid has become another im-
portant area.
In the remainder of this paper, we will concentrate on ILO conventions and recommendations.
We will look at the way they are adopted, trying to characterise the negotiation system as
20 In the 1930s, the ILO had given assistance to its member countries in drafting legislation (Jacob and
Atherton 1972:547).
21 For a recent breakdown of expenditures according to funding sources, see Governing Body document
GB.276/TC/1.
22 international labour standards and technical cooperation, Governing Body document GB 252/15/1,
1992.
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majoritarian or consensual and identifying the actors that vote in favour of them. We will also
ask when and by which countries conventions are ratified and how the supervisory system is
applied. By establishing basic stylised facts, we try to build the ground for further research on
the question why and how standards are adopted and under which conditions countries ratify
conventions.
3 Decision-making over international labour standards
The International Labour Conference adopts conventions and recommendations by qualified
majority of its delegates. To become legally binding, conventions must be ratified by the
member states. These principles have been in place since the establishment of the ILO in
1919. At the time of its foundation, various proposals for these rules had been made (Morhard
1988: 109-112). On the one hand, delegations such as the French and Italian wanted the ILO
to be a supranational body, adopting standards by qualified majority voting which would then
automatically be mandatory on member countries. On the other, there were delegations, such
as the delegation of the United States, who favoured non-binding instruments, leaving the
decision power entirely with the nation state (Valticos and von Potobsky 1995: 267). The ac-
tual rules arose as a compromise between these extremes.
In this section, we will outline the decision procedure that leads to the adoption of internatio-
nal labour standards by the International Labour Conference. In the following sections, the
ratification and implementation of conventions at the national level will be discussed. An
overview of the whole procedure is given in figure 1.
3.1 The choice of the matter regulated by international standards
Subjects for new labour standards are placed on the agenda of the Conference by the Govern-
ing Body (Constitution, Article 14, 1). This is usually done two years ahead of the Confer-
ence. According to the Constitution, the initial proposals for regulation can be made by gov-
ernments, representative organisations of employers and workers and other international or-
ganisations. In practice, almost all proposals come from the Office or the Governing Body.23
A recent report by the Director-General criticises both this practice as well as the Office's
work.24 As a result of such criticism, there have been attempts to broaden consultations with
other actors before a list of subjects for regulation is set up, in order to obtain a more varied
portfolio of proposals.25
23 About 80 per cent of the proposals were made by the Office, while about 20 per cent came from mem-
bers of the Governing Body. Only occasionally have other governments or unions or employers' or-
ganisations made proposals for regulation (Governing Body document GB 268/3).
24 "[...] The choice of new standards is usually centralised and carried out in a rather random way" (Re-
port of the Director-General, 1997).
25 See Governing Body document GB 268/3.
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Figure 1: The ILO's decision procedure: Overview
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The Office assists the Government Body in the decision whether to include an item on the
agenda by preparing documents which contain the current state of law and practice in the
member states.25 It also produces assessments which allow the Governing Body to determine
the "value added" of a standard on the proposed subject.27 There are also certain criteria for
the relevance of a topic, fixed by a working party in 1984, which should be taken into account
(Bartolomei de la Cruz et al. 1996: 37).
As mentioned earlier, the decision to place a subject on the Conference agenda is usually
made by consensus. There are voting rules, however, for the case that a consensus cannot be
reached. The Government Body first votes, by simple majority, on the question whether all
the questions proposed should be put on the agenda. If a majority is not found, members allo-
cate preference points to the proposals. These are then ranked according to the sum of points
they have received. The Governing Body then votes on all proposal minus the least preferred,
minus the two least preferred proposals, etc. until a majority is found (Governing Body
Standing Orders, Article 18).
The Conference may itself place subjects on the agenda by a two thirds majority of its mem-
bers (Constitution, Article 16,3). Any government of a member state may formally object to
the inclusion of a subject on the agenda no matter which institution has set the agenda; the
Conference may turn down such an objection by a majority of two-thirds (Constitution, Arti-
cle 16,1-2). All these possibilities are merely hypothetical: in the period after 1960, there has
not been a single Conference vote on the placement of a new item on the agenda. The only
decisions on the agenda which the Conference has taken are resolutions on holding a second
discussion on a subject already discussed in the first reading (see below).28
3.2 The bargaining stage: drafting conventions and recommendations
3.2.1 Procedure
There are two procedures for adopting international labour standards: the single discussion
and the double discussion procedures. Under the double discussion procedure, which is ap-
plied in the majority of cases, the standard receives two readings at the International Labour
Conference, usually (but not always) in two consecutive years. Only in cases of urgency or in
exceptional circumstances is the Governing Body entitled to choose the single discussion pro-
cedure, which provides for only one reading (Conference Standing Orders, 34, 7). Of all con-
ventions and recommendations adopted between 1960 to 1997, merely five have been adopted
26 Conference Standing Orders, Article 34,2; Governing Body Standing Orders, Article 10,2. The Gov-
erning Body may also convene a preparatory technical conference of experts to discuss whether a sub-
ject is apt for a standard (Conference Standing Orders, Article 34,5; Governing Body Standing Orders,
Article 10,3).
27 For such a report see, for example, Governing Body document GB 273/2 ("Portfolio of proposals for
the agenda of the International Labour Conference as of its 89th Session, 2001").
28 Recall from footnote 10 that no record vote is required in this case, although the decision must be made
by a majority of two-thirds.
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in the single discussion procedure.29 Therefore, we will only follow the double discussion pro-
cedure here. A flow chart is shown in figure 2.
3.2.1.1 Preparatory stages
Once a subject for a standard has been determined by the Governing Body, the Office pre-
pares a "law and practice" report on the situation in the member countries (Conference
Standing Orders, Article 39,1). No later than 18 months before the beginning of the Confer-
ence at which the issue is to be discussed, the report is published and sent to the governments
of the member states. At the same time, governments receive a questionnaire asking them, in
particular, about any obstacles they see to applying the proposed standards. The questionnaire
is sent back by the governments no later than 11 months before the start of the Conference.
Trade unions and employers are to be consulted by the governments during this process.
These responses form the basis of a second report by the Office which contains draft conclu-
sions for the Conference. This report is again sent to the governments, normally no less than
four months before the Conference commences (Conference Standing Orders, Article 39,3).
3.2.1.2 First reading at the Conference
At the Conference, a tripartite ad-hoc committee is established for each regulation project on
the agenda.30 The discussion about the contents of the standard takes place mainly in the
committees, with the Conference in most cases only adopting the committees' reports and
their conclusions without a discussion on individual points. The committees are often large: in
the period between 1974 and 1997, the number of committee members (counted at the start of
the sessions) ranged from 67 to 219, with an average of 148. This is about thirty per cent of
the average number of delegates to the Conference during that period (496).
The protocols of the committee sessions are published in the ILO's Record of Proceedings.
The work of the committees is organised in the following way: the committee first elects its
officers and the reporters. It moves to a general discussion, which consists of an exchange of
views on the aims and purposes of the proposed standard. The committee then discusses the
documents before it, i.e. the Office texts.
In most cases, the committee chooses the type of instrument (i.e., a convention or a recom-
mendation) before holding a detailed discussion on its contents, although this order may be
reversed. Earlier decisions on the form of instruments are sometimes overturned. An example
for this is Convention No. 159. Its subject, vocational rehabilitation, was originally set on the
Conference agenda for the second reading in 1983 "with a view to the adoption of a recom-
mendation" (ILO Record of Proceedings 1982: 25/13). During the committee stage of the sec-
ond reading, however, the worker group moved to adopt the proposal as a convention. The
amendment failed the required majority when voted upon by show of hands. The worker dele-
gates then demanded a record vote, which the amendment passed narrowly.
29 These are: Convention No. 127 and Recommendation No. 128 (Maximum Weight); Convention No.
136 and Recommendation No. 144 (Benzene Hazards); Recommendation No. 167 (Social Security).
30 For the nomination of its members, see section 2.3.1.2.
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Figure 2: The double discussion procedure
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The procedure of voting on the kind of instrument has been revised in 1987 (Valticos and von
Potobsky 1995: 62). Up to that year, committee decisions on this matter had required only a
simple majority. Now, Article 40, 2 of the Conference Standing Orders stipulates that "when
the Conference has referred to a committee the text of a Recommendation only, a decision by
the committee to propose a Convention to the Conference for adoption (in place of or in addi-
tion to the Recommendation) shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast." It has thus
become more difficult to change the type of instrument during a committee session.
The committee then discusses the proposed texts point by point. The Conference Standing
Orders rule that every member of the committee may propose amendments. These amend-
ments, if seconded by another member and not withdrawn, must be voted upon (if they are not
adopted by consensus). Often, there are sub-amendments proposed to amendments brought
forward earlier during the discussion. In this case, the committee follows a backwards agenda,
i.e. the sub-amendment is set against the original amendment, and the original amendment or
the successfully sub-amended amendment is set against the status quo. In cases where alter-
native formulations are considered, two amendments may be set against each other.
In plenary session, the Conference usually adopts the Committee's conclusions without much
discussion. At the same time, the Conference decides whether the issue should be included on
the agenda of the next Conference, or on the agenda of a later session (Conference Standing
Orders, Article 39,4). The Conference may also decide not to issue a resolution to this effect
at all.31
3.2.1.3 Second reading at the Conference
During the 11 months between the first and the second discussion (if they are held in two con-
secutive years), the Office works out the drafts of the instruments. Governments and, through
them, unions and employers have three months to comment on them. Together with these
comments, the Office prepares its fourth report, which is then communicated to the govern-
ments three months prior to the Conference. The Office has a certain degree of autonomy in
drafting the texts of the standards. The Conference Standing Orders only require the Office to
prepare them "on the basis of the replies received to the questionnaire referred to in paragraph
1 and on the basis of the first discussion by the Conference" (Standing Orders, Article 39,6).
However, any possible leeway the Office has is restricted by the fact that the Office text can
be amended during the second discussion. Since the Committee decides by simple majority
and uses an open amendment rule, the degree of Office agenda power does not seem large
from the outset.
After the opening of the Conference, the matter is discussed in a technical committee in the
same way as in the first discussion.32 After the committee has reported to the Conference with
a proposal for a standard, the Conference adopts the text clause by clause. Amendments made
by delegates in plenary sessions are voted on by simple majority (Article 40,3 and 40,4 of the
31 This happened, for example, in the case of the Convention No. 181 (Private Employment Agencies)
which was considered the first time in 1994, but received a second reading only in 1997.
32 The committee's composition may differ from the composition of the committee dealing with the same
subject the year before.
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Conference Standing Orders). Hence, the committees do not possess the power to make "take
it or leave it" proposals to the Conference. Nevertheless, votes on amendments at the plenary
session have been relatively rare, at least since the early 1970s.33 In the majority of cases, the
text is not changed at the plenary session. One explanation could be that the committees re-
flect fairly well the distribution of interests in the conference as a whole. Hence if an amend-
ment has failed at the committee stage, there is little reason to demand a vote on the same
issue during the plenary meeting. Once adopted, the text is sent to its Drafting Committee in
order to examine the details of its formulation.
3.2.2 The occurrence of formal voting in committees
Voting inside the committee is by simple majority. This opens up the possibility of coalitions:
a majority of committee members could amend the Office text to meet their own interests,
disregarding the preferences of those delegates who find themselves in a minority position.
Any coalition of delegates would be restricted by the requirement that the final text must be
adopted by a majority of two thirds at the plenary session. But there is often a certain range of
possible convention texts that would all pass the final voting stage.34
Is coalition-building characteristic for Conference committees? In order to determine the ma-
joritarian or consensual character of the ILO negotiation system, we use the number of votes
(either by show of hands or record votes) as a yardstick.35 It is particularly interesting to look
at how the number of votes evolved over time.
Figure 3 shows the number of record votes and votes by show of hands in Conference com-
mittees between 1960 and 1997, as published in the committee reports attached to the ILO
Record of Proceedings. Only ad-hoc committees set up to discuss proposed conventions or
recommendations were considered. For the discussion of the 54 conventions and 61 recom-
mendations adopted between 1960 and 1997 (excluding maritime standards), a total of 125
Committees had been established. In the double-discussion procedure, there are two commit-
tees per issue, while in the single discussion procedure, only one committee is set up. In total,
the committees held 3026 votes, of which 121 were record votes. In the graph, the data are
averaged over five-year periods.
33 in the 74 discussions of committee reports on conventions and recommendations between 1973 and
1997, only 18 votes by show of hands and four roll-call votes (other than final record votes) were held
at the plenary session stage.
34 Put in technical language, the qualified majority win set to the status quo (i.e., no convention) may be
large at the plenary meeting.
35 There may be, of course, a number of objections to the use of the number of votes as an indicator for the
majoritarian character of the ILO. The most important one is that even in the absence of a consensus, if
delegates can predict the outcome of a vote they may not request one. If they are in a minority position,
they do not want to be seen on the losing side; by contrast, if an amendment is bound to find a majority
of votes, no delegate would object to it. Hence there should be votes only in the case of uncertainty -
and a large number of votes would indicate a high degree of uncertainty rather than a particular lack of
consensus. But this would imply that the outcomes of most of the votes observed are narrow. This is not
the case: in many instances, delegates request a vote even though they must be aware of being in a mi-
nority position.
19
Figure 3: The occurrence of formal voting in committees
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The first observation concerns the high variance in the number of votes over time. The maxi-
mum number of votes in a committee was 105 (Committee on Hygiene in Shops and Offices,
1963). In nine committees, no votes were held. This variance is reflected in the large standard
deviations printed in the graph. Second, we observe that there is no monotonic tendency to-
wards more or less consensus. The number of votes by show of hands declines from the early
60s onwards up to the mid-70s. It peaks again in the early 80s, to decline to quite low levels in
the second half of the 90s. However, none of the averages (except for the last period) is statis-
tically different from any of the other averages at the usual significance levels. Concerning the
number of record votes, there is again no monotonic trend towards a reduction in their num-
ber. Measured by the number of votes, we do not find strong support for Osieke's (1984) as-
sertion that there is a trend towards consensus in the ILO.
The number of votes is likely to be influenced by a number of other factors: e.g., how contro-
versial the issue is; whether the committee held its first or its second discussion; and how
large the committee was (since it is probably easier to reach consensus in a small group of
delegates). To separate these influences from the time trend, we ran a multivariate regression.
The dependent variable is the number of all votes held in committees (record votes plus votes
by show of hands). To control for the length of the discussion, we divided the number of votes
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by the number of sittings the committee held.36 The time effect is estimated nonparametrically
by locally weighted kernel smoothing, using a bandwidth of 0.8 (for the procedure, see
Robinson, 1988). For the regression of the frequency of votes on the subject of conventions
and other variables, the residuals from the smoothing procedure are used. This yields the es-
timated parameters found in table Al of the appendix.
The independent variables are dummy variables defined as the ILO's subject categories (see
the explanations to table 1 above), a dummy variable indicating whether the single or the dou-
ble discussion procedure was used, and a dummy variable for the first versus the second dis-
cussion in the double discussion procedure. The coefficients of the subject variables give the
difference in the number of votes per session of each of the categories to the base category,
which is chosen to be conventions on special categories of workers. From the coefficients, we
see that the number of votes differs slightly with the convention subject. There is significantly
less voting (1.8 and 1.5 votes per session less, respectively) in discussions on social security
and labour administration than there is for the base group. We also see that it is necessary to
distinguish between occupational health and safety and other working conditions: there is, on
average, one vote per session less on the former than on the latter.37 We also see that there is
less voting at the second discussion than at the first discussion in the double discussion proce-
dure, although the difference is not huge and significant only at the ten per cent level. Overall,
the fit of the regression is not large. Thus there are clearly factors the regression does not ac-
count for. The time trend estimated by kernel smoothing (figure Al) shows the same non-
monotonic pattern as the descriptive statistics contained in figure 3.
Any differences found over time and over subjects in the frequency of voting can be inter-
preted in two different ways. They can either indicate the diversity of interests: the farther
apart preferences are, the more difficult is unanimous agreement. On the other hand, delegates
may also attach a positive value to consensus, and the desire to come to a unanimous solution
may vary over time. Consensus may be esteemed particularly because it improves the chances
of ratification of ILO standards.
In all committees, there is some degree of informal bargaining outside the formal proceedings:
it takes communication both to reach unanimity or to organise a voting coalition. But bar-
gaining is more extensive if consensus is sought ex ante, simply because the number of dele-
gates to bargain with increases. The following account is given by the South African Employ-
ers' delegate who acted as Vice-Chairperson of the Committee on Child Labour in 1998:
The ILO is not new to deal-making in the corridors and coffee shops, but these deals are often
precursors to a vote or are part of developing a majority view. ... [T]he expansion of deals to be
inclusive of all the many interests requires holding back on positions until a genuine attempt has
been made to reach consensus first. This can only take place off the record, as in the case of corri-
dor and coffee-shop deals. It enables the parties to engage, unthreatened by public debate and ex-
posure, and to test possible solutions away from public attack.
36 Another way of controlling for this would be to divide the number of votes by the number of motions,
resolutions and amendments brought forward by committee members, but it would have been too cum-
bersome to collect data on these.
37 The difference is significant at the five per cent level (t-value: 2.08).
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Consensus requires institutions that allow many, perhaps secret, cross-issue deals to be settled
and many concessions to be made which might not be popular with the delegates' constituen-
cies. But even if the ILO does indeed move towards decision-making by consensus, as it
seems to have done since the mid-1980s, this does not necessarily mean that the majority rule
provided for in the ILO Constitution and the formal "parliamentarian" procedures of the Con-
ference will become obsolete. They may serve as an instrument of last resort, putting dele-
gates under the threat of being outvoted if they push their interests or those of their constitu-
ents too hard.
3.3 The adoption of international labour standards
3.3.1 The procedure for adoption
The final record vote on the instrument takes place one day after the adoption of the conven-
tion. As mentioned before, a majority of two-thirds of all "yes" and "no" votes is required for
a convention or recommendation to be approved.
3.3.2 Voting outcomes
In this section, we will look at the voting behaviour of the Conference delegates. We restrict
ourselves to final record votes on conventions, leaving aside voting on other issues. The pe-
riod of observation ranges from 1960 to 1997, i.e. we deal with conventions 115 to 181. We
compare voting behaviour over time, groups of delegates and convention subjects.
Each delegate's voting behaviour is documented in the Conference Record of Proceedings.
The decision is noted as "yes", "no" or "abstention". The true number of abstentions, how-
ever, is greater than the one given in the official publications. In addition to the recorded ab-
stentions, there are also undeclared abstentions of those delegates who are counted as partici-
pating in the Conference but do not vote. At present (i.e., before the constitutional changes
mentioned in section 2.1.3.1 will come into force), the effect of declared and undeclared ab-
stentions is the same: in both cases, the delegate counts neither towards the outcome of voting
nor towards the quorum. Thus if a delegate's tactic is to try to prevent the adoption of a con-
vention for lack of a quorum, he or she can use either way of abstaining. Since they produce
the same results, both kinds of abstentions should, in principal, be treated equally in the sta-
tistical analysis. However, we can only infer the number of undeclared abstentions if we have
information on either the number of delegates participating in the conference session or the
quorum, which is half that number. For conventions adopted up to 1974, we do not have this
information, thus most statistics presented here only refer to declared abstentions.
First, consider voting behaviour over time. Figure 4 shows average numbers of votes in ten-
year intervals. The absolute number of votes cast at the Conference rises up to the 1980s, re-
flecting the increase in ILO membership over time. The proportion of yes-votes is constant at
around 90 per cent over this period. Behaviour changes in the 1990s, however. First, we see
that attendance at the voting stage is declining in spite of the increase in ILO membership.
Second, the proportion of yes-votes falls to 80 per cent, while the proportion of negative votes
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rises to five per cent.38 The increase in the number of negative votes in this decade can be at-
tributed to two votes, the first one over Convention No. 173 (protection of workers' claims in
the case of employer's insolvency) and the other over Convention No. 175 (part-time work).
Figure 4: Voting on ILO conventions C115-C181, averages by periods
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We now investigate how voting behaviour differs across delegates. There are two obvious
ways to distinguish delegates: by their home country or by their affiliation to one of the tri-
partite groups. We build three country groupings: Industrialised democracies, the Eastern bloc
and other (third-world) countries.39 Since the Eastern bloc ceased to exist in 1989, we consider
only votes up to that year. Figure 5 shows the proportions of delegates voting yes, no or ab-
staining. Eastern bloc delegates show a markedly different behaviour from the other two
country groupings.40 No delegate from an Eastern bloc country ever voted against a conven-
tion, and abstentions are much less frequent than among delegates from other countries. Be-
tween delegates from industrialised democracies and third-world countries there is little dif-
ference in behaviour, although the degree of abstentions is slightly higher and the proportion
of no-votes slightly lower in the latter group.
38 Pearson-x2 and likelihood ratio tests of independence both rejected the hypothesis of constant voting
behaviour over time (x2=311.8 for the Pearson test and %2=\ 59.8 for the likelihood ratio test).
39 Industrialised countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the U.K., and the U.S.A. The Eastern bloc countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union (including Byelorussia and the
Ukraine which had separate delegations).
40 The Pearson-x2 value for a test of independence across the three country groups was 188.0.
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Figure 5: Voting on ILO conventions: Country Groups
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Figure 6: Voting on ILO conventions: Averages by Delegate Groups
Government Workers Employers
The graph shows the average number of delegates voting yes, no or abstaining at
the final record votes on all ILO conventions from 1960 to 1997. To facilitate
comparisons, the number of government votes have been divided by two.
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Even more significant differences41 in behaviour occur across the tripartite groups (figure 6).
There are almost no votes cast against a convention in the worker group, very little in the gov-
ernment group, but many more (roughly ten per cent of all votes cast) in the employer group.
The same ranking can be observed for the number of abstentions, although there is a much
higher proportion of government delegates declaring their abstention than voting against. Par-
ticipation in voting is higher for the government delegates than for the other two groups. The
number of undeclared abstentions in the employer group is higher than in the worker groups
which can be inferred from the fact that the number of delegates eligible to vote must neces-
sarily be the same in both groups (see above, section 2.3.1.2).
Figure 7 shows the average number of votes for and against as well as the number of declared
abstentions, arranged by subject categories. We observe that the votes against are mainly con-
fined to one or two subject groups: working conditions (excluding health and safety), and, to a
lesser degree, employment policies.
For a smaller sample of record votes on conventions, figure 8 also displays the number of
undeclared abstentions, calculated as two times the quorum minus the number of votes cast
(including declared abstentions). From this graph, one may infer which types of conventions
were most in danger of being rejected due to lack of quorum. It can be observed that unde-
clared abstentions occur most frequently on conventions concerning special categories of
workers. However, if we take as a measure the number of votes against (figure 7) or the num-
ber of votes in committees (table Al), standards on this subject do not appear to be particu-
larly controversial. Thus if delegates do not vote on these conventions in spite of being regis-
tered, it may have more to do with a genuine lack of interest than with the strategic motive to
prevent the necessary quorum.
On the other subjects, the proportion of undeclared abstentions is fairly constant, while there
is huge variation in the number of declared abstentions. We tentatively conclude that Confer-
ence delegates do make a difference between declared and undeclared abstentions, although
formally both decisions have the same consequences on voting outcomes. The difference may
be due to the more public character of declared as compared to undeclared abstentions.
In almost all cases, the results of the record votes show a much greater number of votes in
favour than would be strictly necessary for the adoption of the standard. In the whole period
from 1960 to 1997, there has been no instance where a convention was not adopted at the final
voting stage.42 Should it ever happen that the necessary majority were not reached, a group of
member states could still formally agree to apply the convention (Constitution, Article 21). In
addition, if a convention failed the required majority, the Conference might also decide to
issue it as a non-binding recommendation. All these provisions are, as has been said, merely
hypothetical.
41 With a Pearson-x2 value of 2332.0.
42 By contrast, two recommendations failed due to a lack of quorum in the early 1960s: a recommendation
on the reduction of hours of work in 1961 (it was, however, adopted as recommendation 116 in the fol-
lowing year) and a recommendation on equality of nationals and non-nationals in social security in
1962.
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Figure 7: Voting on ILO conventions: Voting outcomes
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The graph is based on all conventions adopted between 1960 and 1997.
Figure 8: Voting on ILO conventions: declared and undeclared abstentions
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The graph is based on all 25 final record votes on conventions between 1960 and 1997 for which the
quorum could be obtained.
3.4 Abrogating or revising standards
With labour market conditions changing over time, a standard may be considered as outdated
after a number of years. In the case of a recommendation, the Conference could simply adopt
a new standard. By contrast, conventions are revised, and the earlier convention is often
closed for new ratifications when the new convention enters into force.43 The reason for this is
not simply to save administrative costs. Even more important may be the principle that, as
mentioned above, countries should not have a choice of standards of differing stringency to
subscribe to.
The procedure by which conventions are revised follows the normal double-discussion proce-
dure or a special procedure laid down in Articles 43-45 of the Conference Standing Orders;
however, this procedure has been applied for the last time in 1952 (Bartolomei de la Cruz et
al., 1996: 40). The fact that a convention revises another is mentioned in the text of the con-
vention. Up to 1999, a total of 54 conventions have, at least in part, been revised.
Certain conventions have also been marked as "shelved" by the Governing Body which means
that the ILO does not encourage further ratification; however, the "shelving" of a convention
does not impact on its legal status.44
Conventions which have not entered into force can be withdrawn by the Conference.45 By
contrast, it is presently impossible to abrogate a convention if it has received at least two rati-
fications. In 1997, however, the Conference amended the Constitution to the effect that con-
ventions could now be abrogated by a two-thirds majority (see Article 11 of the Conference
Standing Orders). This constitutional amendment has not yet come into force because it needs
to be ratified by a minimum number of member countries (see Article 36 of the Constitution).
4 The ratification and denunciation of conventions
4.1 Ratification of conventions
4.1.1 The ratification procedure
Conventions become legally binding on member states if they are ratified (Constitution, Arti-
cle 19,5), provided that they have legally entered into force.46 This distinguishes conventions
43 ILO Handbook of Procedures, Paragraph 67 (b). Automatic denunciation of the older convention only
takes place if a country ratifies the replacement convention.
4 4
 For a list of "shelved" conventions, see Governing Body document GB 271/LILS/WP/PRS/4/1.
4
 5 Thus the Governing Body decided to place on the agenda of the 2000 Session of the Conference the
question of withdrawal of Conventions Nos. 31, 46, 51, 61 and 66 (Governing Body document GB
271/LILS/WP/PRS/4/1).
4
" To enter into force, a minimum number of ratifications is required. For most conventions, this minimum
is only two ratifications (ILO Handbook of Procedures, Paragraph 26), although some conventions
contain different provisions.
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from recommendations, which are not ratified. The ratification of a convention creates an ob-
ligation to apply the standard set out in the convention. More directly, it also creates an obli-
gation to cooperate with the ILO in the supervision procedures.
Ratification itself is voluntary, although ILO officials sometimes stress a moral obligation to
ensure the ratification of conventions, at least for those governments which have voted in fa-
vour of them.47 There is, however, an obligation for every member state to submit ILO stan-
dards to the authorities competent for the ratification of international conventions within a
time limit of, normally, 12 months; this applies to both conventions and recommendations.
The competent authority is the national parliament or other legislative authority. The object of
this last requirement is to give standards some weight in national-level decision-making, and
to raise the public's awareness on the issue (Handbook of Procedures, Paragraph 12). Prob-
lems may arise in the case of federal states where the responsibility for labour regulation lies
at the regional level. In this case, the standard has to be submitted to the regional legislatures
within 18 months (Constitution, Article 19, 7).
The obligation to submit standards to the legislature may be one of the most important chan-
nels of influence for the ILO. Technically speaking, the ILO sets the agenda for the national
stage, depriving governments of possible gatekeeping rights. This influence is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that the government must only submit the standard to the legislature, and
is under no obligation to propose that the standard be actually ratified (Bartolomei de la Cruz
et al. 1996: 47). The decisive point is that the legislature must be given the opportunity to dis-
cuss the matter. If the government does not submit the standard to the competent authority,
any member country may notify the Governing Body, who will report the failure to the Con-
ference (Article 30 of the ILO Constitution). It is not clear, however, how systematically a
breach of the submission obligation is pursued.48
The ILO's agenda power vis-a-vis the national level mainly arises because conventions can
only be ratified in full; amendments at the national level or reservations are not allowed.49 The
only exception is when the convention itself contains a clause to the effect that countries have
a choice over which parts of the convention to ratify or which alternative models to adopt.
Conventions legally enter into force It is possible to ratify a convention conditional on the
ratification by other member states, although this possibility has not been used for many years
Comparing the statistics on voting and ratification from this and the previous section, one immediately
concludes that government delegates often vote in favour of conventions which are not subsequently
ratified. This has been a persistent concern with the ILO, in particular since the expansion of member-
ship to developing countries after the Second World War (Jacob and Atherton, 1972: 536f). Recently,
the Director-General of the ILO has proposed to make governments which approved a convention at the
Conference more accountable (Report of the Director-General, 1997).
According to the ILO (1977: 36), less than half of the member states fully comply with the obligation to
submit standards to the competent authority within 12 or 18 months.
"ILO has considered this an important provision of the Constitution, and the majority of delegates have
been unwilling to have it changed. Since the conventions result from efforts of labor and employer
groups as well as governments, governments should not be permitted to change provisions by unilateral
action" (Jacob and Atherton, 1972: 538).
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(Valticos and von Potobsky 1995: 272). Thus France first ratified Convention No. 1 condi-
tional on Germany's and Italy's ratification (which, in the former case, was never achieved).
Once a convention is ratified, the member state must make effective the provisions specified
in it (Constitution, Article 19,5). In most cases, this means that national labour law must be
changed.50 In some countries, on ratification, the convention itself becomes binding to work-
ers and employers; in others, separate legal measures have to be taken.51 The most direct obli-
gation arising from ratification is to report regularly on the application of the convention and
the practice in that country in order to make possible the supervision by the ILO (see below).
If the convention is not ratified after it has been submitted to the legislature, the only obliga-
tion that arises is to report in regular intervals (fixed by the Governing Body) on the current
practice with regard to the standard and the obstacles for ratification (Constitution, Article
19,5). These reports are considered by the Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (CEACR), which can demand further reports from non-ratifying countries.
4.1.2 The empirical pattern of ratification
There have been 6604 ratifications of ILO conventions from 1919 to summer 1999. This
means that each of the 174 ILO member states has, on average, ratified 38 conventions. For
several reasons, however, this number is not very meaningful. First, the pattern of ratification
may vary widely across different convention subjects, groups of countries or over time. Thus
one should at least differentiate, as e.g. in Raynauld and Vidal (1998), between countries and
between groups of standards. More importantly however, the number of ratifications up to any
particular moment does not say anything about the probability of a convention being ratified a
certain number of years after adoption, which is what one would ultimately like to know. For
example, if new member countries join the ILO, this will result in a reduction of the average
number of ratifications per member. If fewer new conventions are adopted, this will raise the
average number of ratifications per convention. Both influences on ratification numbers, how-
ever, have nothing to do with the propensity of member countries to ratify existing standards.
Therefore, statistical procedures must be used which eliminate these distortions.
Figure 9 presents the average number of ratifications per member and year from 1950 on-
wards. The purpose is to give an impression of the ratification behaviour over time; however,
the procedure does not take into account the composition effects just mentioned. The first
peak in ratification numbers, around the year 1960, is due to the de-colonialisation which took
full effect at that time. The vast majority of ratifications included in this peak are by African
countries. A second peak occurs around 1978. Again, the reason is the coming into independ-
ence of the last European colonies in Africa.52 The third peak, after 1990, is explained by the
breakdown of the Eastern bloc and the division of multi-ethnic countries in this region (the
The implementation of a standard need not necessarily be in the form of a law. Many conventions
stipulate that they can also be applied by collective agreements or arbitration awards (as in Australia),
although this creates problems if coverage by collective bargaining is not universal. Some conventions
do not require legislation but rather administrative acts to be implemented.
For an extensive discussion of the direct or indirect application of ILO conventions, see Leary (1982).
For instance, of the 205 ratifications in the year 1978, as much as 62 concern the former French colony
of Djibouti.
30
Soviet'Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). In between these peaks, the 1980s have been
a decade with a very low level of ratifications, with the number of ratifications being as low as
35 in 1986 and 1987. A similar statement can be made for the years after 1995. The effect of
new entries into the ILO left aside, there seems to be a tendency towards fewer ratifications
over time.
Figure 9: Ratifications of ILO conventions per ILO member, by year
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
In the following, we estimate the ratification probabilities for a given member country a given
number of years after the adoption of the convention. The methodology we use is Kaplan-
Meier plots. The Kaplan-Meier procedure estimates the survivor function, in our case defined
as the probability of not having ratified a certain convention t days after its adoption, where t
is a running index of time.53 In our figures, we will represent the failure function which is
simply one minus the survivor function. It gives the probability of ratification up to date t.
In order to obtain meaningful results, we have to reduce our sample of ratifications somewhat.
To eliminate the bias from the accession of new members to the ILO, we must restrict our-
selves to countries which have been continually "at risk" of ratifying a convention. Hence,
observations on countries which have not been members at the time the convention was
adopted are discarded. For the same reason, if a country has not been a member over the
whole period at which the convention was open to ratification, it is eliminated from the da-
Formally, the Kaplan-Meier estimator of ratification is given as
n, - r .
where rij is the number of countries not having ratified up to time tj and r,- is the number of ratifications
which the convention receives at time tf, see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980: 12).
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taset for those conventions which have been adopted prior to its most recent re-entry.54 Like-
wise, data on countries which were split up or united were excluded for conventions adopted
prior to the territorial change.55 This leaves us with a data set of 3,356 ratifications.
Figure 10 shows the cumulated ratification probabilities for all conventions as well as for each
type of convention separately. The subject groups are the same as in table 1 above. On the
vertical axis, we measure the probability of ratification. On the horizontal axis, we measure
time in days after adoption (10,000 days corresponding to 27 years and 5 months).
Each of the graphs gives the estimated ratification probabilities t days after the adoption of the
convention. The graphs displaying two curves show the ratification probability for one subject
group in one curve (labelled "1") and for all the other groups together (labelled "0") in the
second curve. By this means, we can compare whether ratification behaviour in this group
differs from all others taken together.
The first thing to notice is that the shape of the ratification function is concave. This means
that the probability of ratification at any particular moment, given non-ratification up to that
moment, is declining. This finding may be explained by the fact that the pressure for ratifica-
tion is highest shortly after the adoption. It may also be due to conventions becoming less
topical after some time. Overall, the probability of having ratified a convention after 10 years
is 16.6 per cent, and after 25 years it is 25.3 per cent.
The type-specific graphs show that there is a notable difference between ratification of human
rights standards and all other conventions. The probability is higher for all dates since adop-
tion; thus 25 years after adoption, the probability of having ratified a human rights standard is
49.4 per cent, while it is only 23.6 per cent for all other conventions. A very significant find-
ing is that the ratification function for human rights conventions is almost linear between
5,000 and 18,000 days after ratification (i.e., between 14 and 50 years) . Hence the rate of
ratification is constant over an extended period of time. Put differently, the median duration
up to ratification for all countries having ratified a standard in the observation period is much
higher for human rights standards than for other conventions.
Other subjects which have a higher ratification probability are conventions on employment,
labour administration, and employment of women and children. Among those subjects having
a lower ratification probability are conventions on migrant workers, indigenous peoples and
specific groups of workers. This is unsurprising because there is only a limited number of
countries for which standards in these areas are relevant. More interesting is the fact that con-
ventions on working conditions, health and safety and social security also receive fewer ratifi-
cations.56
5 4 We make an exception, however, for countries with short absences (up to five years) from the ILO, like
the U.S. which left the ILO from 1977 to 1980.
55 This concerns Czechoslovakia, Germany, the Soviet Union, Yemen, and Yougoslavia. Other territorial
changes have not been accounted for.
56 We performed logrank tests of equality of the cumulated ratification functions. For all subject groups,
we compared the specific survivor function with the suvivor function of all the other conventions taken
together. We found the following x2 values: human rights conventions: 407.0; employment: 75.9; social
policy: 0.02; labour administration: 64.4; industrial relations: 2.6; working conditions: 14.9; health and
safety: 10.6; social security: 11.5; women: 30.3; children: 12.9; migrants: 30.7; indigenous peoples:
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Figure 10: Kaplan-Meier-Estimates of cumulated ratification probabilities, by conven-
tion subjects
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22.2; specific categories of workers: 147.1. This means that, at one degree of freedom, the differences
were significant at the one per cent level for all subjects except social policy and industrial relations.
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Figure 10 (continued)
Employment Social Policy
1OOOO 20000
analysis time
Labour Administration Industrial Relations
10000 20000
analysis time
Working Conditions, excluding Health and Safety Health and Safety
10000 20000
analysis time
34
Figure 10 (continued)
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Figure 11: Kaplan-Meier-Estimates of cumulated ratification probabilities, by country
groups
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In figure 11, we plot the Kaplan-Meier failure functions for ratification by a group of industri-
alised democracies against ratification by all other countries.57 The result is not surprising:
industrialised democracies have a significantly higher probability of ratifying ILO conven-
tions at any time after the adoption of the standard.58 For example, the estimated ratification
probability after 25 years is 39.1 per cent for developed countries, and only 21.4 per cent for
the others. The distinction between these two groups of countries is, of course, very crude; for
example, the group of industrialised democracies comprises both Spain (126 ratifications up
to 1999) and the United States (12 ratifications). Much more work will have to be done to
disentangle the factors that impact on the likelihood of ratification.
4.2 Denouncing conventions
Member countries may denounce a convention they have ratified. A denunciation is possible
only at certain points in time, stipulated in the texts of the conventions themselves. Most con-
ventions can only be denounced ten years after coming into force, and only during an interval
of one year. Denunciation becomes possible again after subsequent periods of ten years
(Handbook of Procedures, paragraph 69). A government denouncing a convention is obliged
to communicate the reasons for the denunciation to the Governing Body in writing. The vast
majority of denunciations take place in the context of the revision of a convention; of all 460
denunciations up to 1997 contained in the ILOLEX database, only 57 concern conventions
For the list of industrialised democracies, see footnote 39.
The logrank test gave a 2- value of 418.6, which is again highly significant.
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other than the 54 which have been revised.59 This means that less than one per cent of all rati-
fication decisions have actually been reversed.
5 The supervision procedures
One of the obligations arising from ratification is the requirement to regularly provide reports
to the International Labour Office which are then examined by legal experts. These communi-
cations form the regular supervision procedure. In the following, we will deal with this proce-
dure first before turning to other means of supervision.
5.1 The regular system of supervision
The regular system is based on periodic reporting on measures to give effect to ratified con-
ventions. In principle, reports have to be submitted annually (Constitution, Article 22). If
strictly applied, this requirement would result in many more reports than could be evaluated at
the Office. Therefore, the reporting system has been changed several times (Bartolomei de la
Cruz et al., 1996: 68). Current regulations date from 1993.
The first report a government has to submit is due in the year after the convention entered into
force in that country. The second report must be sent to the Office two years after the first.
Further reports must be handed in every five years, except for fundamental or priority con-
ventions (see section 2.4.2), where reports are due every two years. For conventions which
have been "shelved" (see section 3.4), the obligation to report has been abolished. There are
also non-periodic reports, either at the initiative of the Conference or under the special super-
visory procedure discussed in the next section.
All reports must be communicated to the "most representative" trade unions and employer
associations, in order to give them a chance to comment on them (Constitution, Article 23). If
the Office receives a statement from one of these organisations, the government is requested
to provide further information. This amounts to further reporting obligations in between the
regular reporting cycle (Swepston 1997: 336). The ILO depends to a large extent on the
transmission of interest groups' knowledge about national conditions (Jacob and Atherton,
1972: 542). To be effective, this requires independent trade unions and employer organisa-
tions (Korner-Dammann 1991: 47).
At the International Labour Office, the reports are examined by the Committee of Experts on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR, see section 2.3.1.2). The
CEACR meets annually and submits its reports to the Conference Committee on the Applica-
tion of Standards. Its statements fall into three groups. "Observations" are made in cases of
clear and persistent non-compliance with the provisions of the convention. "Direct requests"
are made in connection with less important subjects; they are not published but sent directly to
the governments. "Acknowledgements" are made when a government has reacted satisfacto-
rily to a "direct request". Observations can be general in nature, but more frequently concern
the application of a specific convention by an individual country ("individual observations").
5 9
 Cf. section 3.4.
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To take a brief look at the empirical application of the supervision procedure, we exclusively
draw on information for the years from 1990 to 1997.60 On average, the CEACR made 425
individual observations per year during this period.61 Figures 12 to 14 show some of the pat-
terns that can be observed.
Figures 12 and 13 display the conditional probability of receiving an observation on a con-
vention in a given year during the 1990-97 period, given that the convention has been rati-
fied.62 To estimate this probability, we divided the number of CEACR observations in each
year by the number of ratifications up to the beginning of that year. We then averaged these
numbers over the eight years of the period under investigation and over countries.
Figure 12: CEACR observations by countries
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of receiving a CEACR observation on a ratified
convention within a single year between 1990 and 1997
60 Data from earlier periods are not available electronically.
61 For an earlier statistical account of the CEACR's operation, see Landy (1966).
62 For country i, we estimate this probability by
1 mi b?r(country i receives observation) = - ^ "
° (=1990 / , ru
where b, is the number of observations made by the CEACR in year t and r,- is the number of ratifica-
tions during year j .
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Figure 12 shows the distribution of individual observations by groups of countries.63 We find
that industrialised democracies have a one third lower probability of receiving an observation
by the CEACR.
From figure 13, we observe that many more observations are made concerning human rights
standards, as compared to all other subject groups. Other subject groups where observations
are made relatively frequently are employment and social security, while oberservations are
less frequent for conventions on working conditions or health and safety. These numbers are,
however, difficult to interpret. Observations on human rights conventions are more frequent
than others probably not because compliance is worse. Rather, their number reflects the fact
that six out of seven "priority conventions" with shorter reporting intervals are human rights
standards. It may also be that the CEACR attaches a higher importance to these instruments
and is therefore less tolerant in cases of non-compliance.
Figure 13: CEACR observations by convention subjects
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The graph shows the estimated probability (in per cent) of receiving a CEACR
observation on a ratified convention within a single year between 1990 and 1997
It is also interesting to ask whether the CEACR often makes repeated observations on the
non-compliance of a country with respect to the same convention. This could give an indica-
63 For the country groups, see footnote 39.
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tion on the persistence of non-compliance (and perhaps also on how fast a country introduces
changes in response to the CEACR's comments.) According to figure 14, the most frequent
case in absolute numbers (with 335 instances) is that only one observation was received by a
country on a particular convention, compared to, for example, 131 cases where a country re-
ceived five observations. However, if we look at the distribution of the number of observa-
tions, we see that roughly 90 per cent of the 3405 observations over the 1990-97 period oc-
curred in cases where the CEACR repeatedly demanded better implementation of a conven-
tion.
Figure 14: The incidence of repeated CEACR observations
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The graph shows the number of cases where 1, 2, etc., observations were received
by a country on a given convention between 1990 and 1997.
The report of the CEACR is the basis for the discussion in the Conference Committee on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations. The Conference Committee selects cases
of non-compliance mentioned in the CEACR's report, asking the governments concerned for
written or oral statements. There is no automatic obligation to prepare further reports by gov-
ernments which have received observations. Publicity may be given to individual cases when
the Conference discusses the committee report in plenary session.
5.2 The special system of supervision
Outside the regular supervision procedure, there are two complaints procedures. According to
Article 24 of the Constitution, unions and employer associations may make "representations"
against governments if they believe that they do not comply with their obligations from ratifi-
cation. In the past, this procedure was only infrequently used, but representations have been
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more frequent recently (Swepston 1997: 338). In the second complaints procedure, laid down
in Article 26, a government can file a complaint against another government if both ratified
the convention in question. This procedure is also open to individual Conference delegates
and the Governing Body. For the first time, it was used in 1961; up to the end of 1994, there
have only been 22 cases of complaints (Bartolomei de la Cruz et al. 1996: 93f). Of these, only
five were made by governments. After a complaint has been made, the Governing Body may
establish a Commission of Inquiry. If the country does not accept the ruling of this commis-
sion, which has happened only in very few cases so far, the case may be brought before the
International Court of Justice. This, however, has never happened in the ILO's history. In the
most recent application of the Article 26 procedure concerning Convention No. 29 (Forced
Labour) and the government of Myanmar, the Conference passed a resolution which excluded
Myanmar from receiving ILO technical cooperation and from participating in ILO meetings
and seminars. This was one of the most drastic sanctions ever imposed on a country by the
ILO.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have looked at decision-making over ILO labour standards at three stages:
the adoption of standards by the International Labour conference, the ratification of conven-
tions by member states and the implementation behaviour as measured by the Committee of
Experts reports. Our statistical findings suggest the following broad picture:
• At the final voting stage, there is often near-unanimity concerning ILO conventions, al-
though the average proportion of "yes" votes has recently declined. Votes against are
mainly confined to the employer group. Sometimes, however, there is a non-negligible
number of abstentions which may be "no"-votes in disguise.
• Majority voting is quite frequent during negotiations leading to labour standards. There
has been a weak trend towards more consensus and fewer formal votes over the last two
decades.
• The average number of ratifications per member is strongly influenced by the accession of
new ILO members and the number of conventions adopted, hence one must be careful in
interpreting the time pattern. However, the average number of ratifications per member
and year has reached a comparatively low level in the 1990s. Calculations with a given
group of members show that, over the whole period of the ILO's existence, the probability
of ratification is about 25 per cent after 25 years, with significant differences across
groups of members and convention subjects.
• Similar differences characterise implementation behaviour. Most cases of non-compliance
with obligations from the ratification of conventions were repeatedly noticed by the
Committee of Experts, suggesting persistent problems with the implementation of ILO
standards.
The data on which our tables and figures are based will in future be more thoroughly ex-
ploited. Drawing on formal models of political decision-making, we will explore why dele-
gates vote in a certain way at the committee stage and whether there are consistent voting
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patterns. We will also further distinguish the factors that influence the propensity to ratify
conventions. These factors may relate both to conventions as well as to countries. And finally,
the same should be done with respect to the CEACR observations. The results from these in-
vestigations shall then be used to better explain how the contents of conventions and recom-
mendations is chosen and to identify possible problems and inefficiencies in the ILO's nego-
tiation system.
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Appendix A: Non-parametric regression of the occurrence of voting in committees
Table Al: Covariate estimates
Dependent Variable: Number of votes per committee session.
Data: All committees on standards, 1960-1997.
Independent Variable
a) Subject dummy variables (base cate-
gory: specific categories of workers)
Basic human rights
Employment
Social policy
Labour administration
Industrial relations
Conditions of work (excluding health and
safety)
Health and safety
Social security
Employment of women
Child work
Migrant workers
b) Procedure dummy variables
(base category: first discussion)
Second discussion
Single discussion
Constant
Number of observations
R2
adjusted R2
Coefficient
-0.030
-0.240
-1.824
-1.546
-0.623
0.517
-0.486
-0.117
0.654
0.492
-0.371
-0.468
-0.966
0.050
t-value
-0.05
-0.48
-1.75
-2.55
-0.73
1.05
-1.06
-0.18
0.63
0.49
-0.42
-1.80
-1.32
0.39
110
0.20
0.09
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Figure Al: Kernel smoothed time path
Lowess smoother, bandwidth = .8
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1960
Year
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